This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which children seek to manipulate the size of the end-of-life bequest they receive from the parent. I first use numerical simulations to show this intergenerational strategic behavior does not negate the debt neutrality assertions of Ricardian equivalence.
INTRODUCTION
strategic behavior is present. The greater importance of saving in strategic specifications leads consumers to save more of the proceeds of a debt-financed tax cut, thus producing less crowding out than occurs in the specification without strategic behavior.
The effects of changing inheritance and capital gains tax rates is a topic of considerable current interest. One theory observes that parents who want to bequeath a specific amount to children will need to save more when the inheritance tax rate rises. If true, then reducing the inheritance tax rate should cause aggregate saving to decline. A competing theory holds that taxing bequests increases the cost of giving bequests, which leads people to shift resources away from giving bequests and away from saving for them. In this case, reducing the inheritance tax rate should cause aggregate saving to increase. Which of these theories holds in practice remains an open question. 8 The movement to reduce estate taxes in the U.S. will likely provide clearer evidence on this issue in the future.
In the dynastic model employed here, with altruism as the motive for bequests, it is expected that lower inheritance tax rates will increase bequests and aggregate saving. 9 This is consistent with, for example, the theoretical findings of Laitner (2001) and the empirical findings of Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) . Kopczuk and Slemrod also discuss the theoretical justifications for their result, examining the substitution and income effects at work when a government imposes an inheritance tax.
THE MODEL
The basic framework is a standard dynastic model with overlapping generations of three-period lived consumers. The use of three-period lived consumers provides both members of adjacent generations the opportunity to behave strategically. Only when the individuals can each make decisions in both of two overlapping periods can they make potentially manipulative choices in one period while still having a subsequent period of interaction. Consumers are homogeneous and there is no aggregate or individual uncertainty. Individuals are intertemporally linked by one-sided intergenerational altruism (parent to child). Each consumer has one child, born at the beginning of the parent's second period of life. In the third period of life a parent may transfer any nonnegative amount of resources to his child.
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The government finances production of a public good by levying taxes, issuing debt, or both. (I begin with only lump sum taxes in order to test Ricardian equivalence. Later, when examining crowding out, I add capital and inheritance taxes as well.) The amount of the public good and the financing method are exogenously specified. The public good enters consumers' utility function in an additively separable manner.
The economy has the following additional characteristics:
• A large finite number (N) of identical consumers is born at each time period.
• Each consumer is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life. This time is inelastically supplied as labor.
• A consumer born at time may save (or borrow) an amount at age j (j = 1,2). The net return on saving (cost of borrowing) initiated at time t is t t j a 1 t r + . A consumer is not allowed to borrow against a possible future bequest he may receive, but may borrow against future wage income.
• The government collects per capita lump-sum taxes ( t τ ), produces a public good ( ), and can issue debt ( t x t D ) in each period t. The government must eventually retire any debt it issues.
• The aggregate capital stock is the sum of private and public saving. That is, 
• Consumers born at time t have preferences over their own consumption, their child's utility ( ), and the public good as follows: • A single representative firm produces all goods for the economy according to the aggregate production function
where is aggregate labor supplied at time t. F is strictly increasing and concave with respect to both arguments.
t L
• Prices and are given by the time t marginal products of capital and labor respectively. 
MANIPULATION IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
The main issue here is specification of when the bequest amount is chosen. Two possibilities exist:
(1) The parent chooses a bequest amount at the beginning of his life and is unable to deviate from that choice.
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(2) The parent chooses the bequest amount in the final period of his lifetime.
To date, researchers using an overlapping generations model have consistently chosen some form of the first approach. We refer to this approach as one of 'precommitment' (to the future bequest amount) or as non-manipulative. The bequest amount is chosen during the parent's first period of life and cannot later be changed. While easier to compute, this approach introduces time consistency problems on the part of the parent. For example, a parent may wish to provide additional resources to a child who squandered resources when young or to give less to a child who saved a large amount when young, but is constrained from doing so. 13 The unrealistic nature of this restriction, combined with the time consistency problem, makes precommitment a difficult assumption to defend in practice.
In the second approach the child's first period actions may influence the size of the bequest she receives. This gives both individuals the opportunity to behave strategically and is the primary focus of this paper. The strategy available to the child is to overconsume when young, in contrast to smoothing consumption over her lifetime. Later, when the parent is ready to choose a bequest amount, the child presents herself as a relatively poor individual and asks for a larger bequest. The child's ability to successfully manipulate the parent depends on the parent's affinity for the child and on both individuals' wealth and income levels. The child's interest in being manipulative depends primarily on her substitution rate between current and future consumption.
The parent may anticipate the potential for manipulation by his child. By slightly decreasing his second-period savings amount (which will still be much greater than the amount saved under precommitment) he can reduce the assets available to him when elderly. This diminishes the child's ability to elicit a larger bequest from the parent. The parent's success in mitigating the child's potential manipulation depends in part on the timing of their decisions within a period. One possibility is simultaneous choices of consumption, savings and bequests by all consumers alive in a period. A second possibility is sequential choices by the consumers alive in a period: oldest to youngest. 14 When the parent chooses his consumption and savings amounts first he is more successful at reducing the effect of the child's manipulation than he is when their choices are simultaneous.
I consider both of these specifications because it is not at all clear one is preferable to the other.
The simultaneous choices approach is certainly more common but, as O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) points out, "In reality, of course, parents are born before children and make a large fraction of their consumption decisions before their children become independent adults. A more natural modeling approach would therefore be to make parents the 'leaders' in a sequential game." (O'Connell and Zeldes 1993, 364) .
Consideration of both specifications also helps demonstrate the robustness of the Ricardian equivalence and smaller crowding out results.
SIMULTANEOUS CHOICES
This section describes the model specification arising from the assumption of simultaneous consumption, saving, and bequest choices by the individuals alive in a period.
The standard way to analyze a representative-consumer economy with overlapping generations is to write out the consumer's objective function and all relevant constraints, differentiate with respect to all decision variables and construct the first-order conditions that govern the consumer's choices. One can readily take this traditional approach when a consumer's choices are independent of choices yet to be made by other individuals. This occurs when individuals can commit to an end-of-life bequest amount at the beginning of their life; that is, when the bequest amount depends only on the consumer's resources and his affinity for his child. However, the problem is more complicated when the choice of a bequest amount is dependent on choices yet to be made by other individuals -specifically, his child's first-period consumption (versus saving) choice. In this case the consumer must wait until the final period of his life (after the child's first period) to choose a bequest amount. Therefore, in describing the choices a consumer makes in this economy I begin with the problem facing a consumer in his last period of life and proceed using backwards induction.
The problem facing an elderly consumer (presented analytically below) requires analyzing the trade-off he experiences between using his resources for current consumption versus bequeathing them to his child. The fewer resources held by the child at this time, the greater will be the parent's bequest. The first order conditions governing this decision can be combined to form "decision rules" that specify how the elderly consumer should allocate his resources between consumption and bequest as a function of the resources he holds and of the resources his child holds. Working backwards, these decision rules will be used by the parent when making decisions in the preceding period (when middle-aged) about how many resources should be carried into the last period of life versus consumed in middle age. Similarly, the child will use knowledge of the decision rule governing the amount of bequest she will receive when making decisions in the preceding period (when young) about how much to consume or save that period.
The process continues by next considering the problem facing a middle-aged consumer. He faces a trade-off between current consumption versus saving for his elderly period. Saving more will allow him to consume more when elderly as well as allow him to give a larger bequest. The presence of strategic behavior means that the more he saves, the more his child will seek to obtain from him, thus providing a potential drawback to saving. Fortunately the "bequest rule," determined from analysis of the problem facing an elderly consumer, embodies all these considerations. Again, combining the consumer's first order conditions allows formulation of additional decision rules that govern middle-aged allocation of resources between current consumption and saving as functions of the savings amount he chose when young and the bequest he receives. He will use knowledge of these rules when making decisions in the preceding period (when young) about how much to consume or save that period.
The backwards induction process concludes with analysis of the trade-off between current consumption versus saving that confronts a young consumer. The previously developed decision rules make clear how increasing saving can provide him more of his own resources in the future, but will lead to him receiving a lower bequest. Combining knowledge of these rules with his current-period budget constraint allows him to choose the optimal consumption and savings amounts when young.
Perhaps this problem could be written down in a traditional manner, but doing so would require finding some way to capture the dependence of a consumer's bequest amount on his future child's first period consumption versus saving choice. We could certainly write the consumer's third period budget constraint as , where However, since the child won't choose this amount until the second period of the parent's life, it isn't possible for the parent to solve this problem at the beginning of his life. Thus the backwards induction approach seems the most practical.
To better illustrate the interactions between members of different generations, in the descriptions below I take the perspective of examining the decisions by the three consumers alive within a particular period rather than tracking a single consumer across three time periods. The only real difference lies in the time superscripts. The resulting equilibrium is a type of Nash equilibrium.
Since the amount of the public good is exogenously specified and enters the utility function in an additively separable manner it has no effect on the consumption decisions of consumers. Therefore, for expositional clarity, I omit it from the descriptions below.
An Elderly Consumer
The consumer who is elderly at time t (born at time t -2) chooses consumption, , and a bequest, The primary concern of an elderly consumer is the trade-off between his own current consumption ( ) and the impact his bequest will have on his child's current consumption ( ). He knows the child faces a similar trade-off between his current consumption and saving.
He also knows the child will use savings from this period to maximize utility next period. Assuming the child will act rationally in maximizing his utility means (by application of the envelope theorem) the child's current savings choice implicitly maximizes his current and future utility. Thus an elderly consumer need not explicitly incorporate his child's future decisions into his current maximization problem.
The elderly consumer's first order conditions can be combined to give
Substituting in the respective budget constraints allows equation (4) 
The child considers this bequest function when young while attempting to manipulate the size of her parent's bequest through her choice of consuming
A Middle-Aged Consumer
A consumer who is middle-aged at time t (born at time t -1) chooses consumption, , and savings, , to maximize his utility from present and future consumption plus the discounted utility ( ) of his currently young child. Thus he solves the following problem: (5), taking as given). Then equation (7) specifies as a function of
Assuming the child acts rationally, as will her child, etc., to maximize utility means (by application of the envelope theorem) the parent's current savings choice will be utility maximizing for all future generations as well as being optimal for him today. Thus a middle-aged consumer need not explicitly incorporate his child's future decisions into his current maximization problem.
We again combine the resulting first order conditions to develop implicit functions for . Also, the current young consumer uses awareness of these functions when choosing her current consumption and savings amounts.
A Young Consumer
A consumer who is young at time t chooses consumption, and savings, , to maximize her utility from present and future consumption plus the discounted utility of her as-yet-unborn child. Thus she solves the following problem: given are the decision rules governing the choices of middle-aged and elderly consumers.
The young consumer will combine her knowledge of the decision rules developed for choices made by middle-aged and elderly consumers with knowledge about her parent's current saving ( 1 2 t a − ) in order to manipulate the bequest her parent will choose next period. With these decision rules in place, we can see that the young consumer's savings choice implicitly specifies all future consumption and savings amounts. Thus by using backwards induction, and developing behavioral rules for each period of life, we've reduced the consumer's problem to one that can be solved in the first period of life.
The young consumer's first order conditions can be combined to show the trade-off between present consumption and saving: 
SEQUENTIAL CHOICES
Uncertainty regarding the true nature of parent-child interactions, coupled with the fact that the sequential-choice specification produces different allocations than does the simultaneous-choice specification, strongly indicates we should evaluate it as well. However, since this specification is structurally identical to the simultaneous-choice specification I omit a detailed description of it here.
The primary difference between the two specifications is that here a middle-aged consumer does not treat the young consumer's savings amount as given. Analysis of the problem facing the young child allows us to formulate her saving decision as a function of the savings amount chosen by today's middleaged consumer. Recognizing the impact his saving choice will have on the child's saving choice increases the parent's ability to reduce the child's potential manipulative behavior.
COMPUTER SIMULATION
The specific functional forms used in the simulations are as follows.
• Utility of Consumption is given by
• Production Function is given by:
(1 ) ( )
where is aggregate labor supplied at time t and
• Prices are given by their respective marginal products so
AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate the differences between the equilibria of the different specifications I choose a set of parameter values (see Table 1 years. The appendix offers specific details regarding calibration of the different model specifications to observations of the U.S. economy. A significant difference between this example and the calibration discussed in the appendix is that all government policy variables were set to zero for this example. The results are qualitatively insensitive to parameter variations.
[insert Table 1 here] 
.) The parent chooses a bequest amount knowing his child will also smooth consumption over the three periods of her life. Thus the amount of bequest given depends only on the parent's affinity for his child and the lifetime wealth of each individual. As expected, in the nonmanipulative specification, the parent gives the smallest bequest, first period consumption is smallest of any of the three specifications and second and third period consumption amounts are largest. Utility is lower under this specification, for similarly sized economies, than it is under the other two specifications.
The second column shows the equilibrium resulting in the simultaneous-choice specification. In this specification, since the return to saving is lower here than in the non-manipulative specification ( in equation (10)), consumers decrease first-period saving and increase first-period consumption. By having fewer assets when the parent chooses a bequest amount, children can successfully manipulate parents into giving significantly larger bequests. Compared to the other specifications, this specification produces the largest first period consumption amount, the smallest second and third period consumption amounts and the largest bequest amount. In addition, utility is the largest of any of the three specifications -primarily a result of shifting consumption forward in time. Table 2 here]
The child's decision to consume a large amount when young, and even to borrow to finance this consumption, increases the parent's marginal benefit of giving a bequest. This leads the parent to increase second period saving in order to finance the larger bequest. Note that roughly 70 percent of second-period savings will go to bequests in this specification, compared to roughly 20 percent in the non-manipulative specification. In addition, middle-aged individuals receive larger bequests than they did in the non-manipulative specification. This additional income facilitates an even greater increase in saving and also allows him to increase second-period consumption, almost restoring it to the amount enjoyed without a manipulative child.
In this specification, as in the non-manipulative specification, a middle-aged parent makes his second-period saving choice taking as given the bequest of his elderly parent and the first-period saving of his child. Since these quantities are inputs to the decision rules developed in the preceding section, the middle-aged consumer chooses to smooth consumption over his second and third periods of life.
Two columns are presented for the sequential-choice specification. The first uses the same parameter values as are used for the other two specifications. Note that the sequential-choice specification generates a lower output level than the other two specifications -the substantially lower second period saving produces a lower capital-labor ratio in this specification. This naturally causes lower consumption, savings and bequest amounts, and a lower utility level. To better compare these amounts with those of the first two equilibria, multi-factor productivity is increased in the final column (to A = 2.7162) in order to bring total output up to the level observed in the first two specifications.
Comparing the amounts in the final column to those of the simultaneous-choice specification reveals that under sequential choices a parent is able to somewhat mitigate his child's manipulation. This is evidenced by the lower bequest amount than that given under simultaneous choices. First period consumption falls slightly as first period saving rises. Second and third period consumption amounts rise slightly and second period saving falls substantially. The net result is a slightly lower utility level than that obtained in the simultaneous-choice specification. (Note, however, that utility in the unadjusted case, with A = 2.5, is even lower than that obtained in the non-manipulative specification.)
The parent can reduce his child's manipulation because he now makes his second-period choices before the child makes her first-period choices. By choosing first, and using the child's first-order condition to anticipate the savings amount the child will subsequently choose, the parent effectively chooses the bequest amount as well (using equation (5)). The parent chooses a smaller second-period savings amount (than in the simultaneous-choice specification) so as to have fewer extortable assets when elderly. The child reacts by choosing a larger first-period savings amount. With the child choosing after the parent, the child's choice will likely affect the amount of bequest the parent will give next period. As a result, individuals no longer smooth consumption over the second and third periods of life.
Comparisons to the non-manipulative specification follow the same pattern as described above for the simultaneous-choice specification. Also, the ratio of saving to output in the non-manipulative and simultaneous-choice specifications is 5.3 percent -similar to that observed in the U.S. over the last 20
years. This ratio falls to approximately 4.0 percent in the sequential-choice specification.
Perhaps the most significant inference to be drawn from this example is that, when strategic behavior is present, overconsumption by young consumers increases their dependence on bequests for the resources needed to finance consumption and saving in their second and third periods of life. This increased emphasis on bequests forces parents to save more in their second period of life and to spend a larger portion of their second-period savings on bequests. The increased importance of saving and bequests noted here for strategic model specifications will play a significant role in later assessment of the crowding out effect of government debt.
TESTING RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE WITH LUMP SUM TAXES
Ricardian equivalence predicts that an altruistic parent will increase the size of his transfer to help his child (or other descendant) with their new tax burden. Given that allowing strategic behavior alters the margins at which decisions are made, it seems unlikely the parent will still increase his bequests by the amount of a tax decrease when confronted with a manipulative child. Using a wide variety of parameter values, I examine each specification and find that the substitution of government debt for lump sum taxes has no real effects. Savings and bequests increase temporarily as the proceeds of the tax cut are saved and passed on to future generations. This result is independent of the sequence of choices within a period and occurs in spite of the fact that altering the sequence of choices does change the resulting allocations.
To demonstrate the robustness of this result, simulation runs were made with a large number of different parameter configurations. For example, repayment of the debt was delayed several periods and different size deficits were considered. The results indicate Ricardian equivalence holds for all specifications.
As Seater (1993) observes, it is reasonable to expect Ricardian equivalence fails whenever a child successfully manipulates his parent's bequest amount. However, since this is not the result here we must re-evaluate our intuition. It is tempting to conclude the result is a natural outcome of the view that each family is actually "one big happy family" in which the parent effectively determines how the family's resources will be distributed. This analogy fails when we realize that the resulting allocations are not optimal, as evidenced by the fact that individuals achieve higher utility when allowed to behave strategically than when not.
Consider that each individual overlaps with a parent for two periods then, as the parent dies, becomes a parent himself and overlaps with his child for two periods, who subsequently overlaps with her child for two periods and so on. This effectively produces a sequence of two-period parent-child interactions. Rebelein (2002) shows that, in a static, two-period model with strategic behavior, shifting tax burdens from parent to child has no effect on consumption or aggregate saving. The question is, what happens when we introduce perturbations to the dynamic environment? Specifically, how do these perturbations propagate -do they expand or damp out? Given the subgame perfect nature of the equilibrium in each period small perturbations should damp out, rather than expand, over time. A small perturbation is defined as one that does not lead to corner solutions in a period. By construction we are studying only interior solutions so all perturbations are small by definition. Thus any change in the timing of taxes should damp out and Ricardian equivalence will hold.
More directly, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) asserts that, when private transfers are operative, public transfers will be neutral when the game played between generations is strategically equivalent before and after the public transfer. Using their change-of-variable approach reveals that the substitution of debt for taxes produces a linear shift of the strategy space, but leaves the structure of the game unchanged (assuming transfers remain operative). This suggests we should expect Ricardian equivalence to hold in spite of the presence of strategic behavior. 
DISTORTIONARY TAXES AND CROWDING OUT
When Ricardian equivalence holds private saving will increase by the amount of debt issued and private investment stays constant. When Ricardian equivalence fails private saving increases by some lesser amount (or may even fall) and private investment falls. The difference between the increase in private saving and the amount of debt issued equals the amount of private investment crowded out by the debt.
Given that Ricardian equivalence fails in the presence of distortionary taxes it may be useful to be able to gauge how close an approximation Ricardian equivalence is for a particular economy. The ratio of the amount of private investment crowded out to the amount of debt issued can be an effective measure of the impact of deficit financing on a particular economy. 20 The goal of this section is to determine whether the presence of intergenerational strategic behavior has any effect on the amount of crowding out caused by the substitution of government debt for current taxation and, if so, to clarify the nature of that effect.
ASSESSING CROWDING OUT
Let R be the degree to which Ricardian equivalence holds. I define R as
with ( 1 2 j j a = , ) being the steady state, pre-debt savings amounts and D ∆ the increase in debt.
The value of R indicates the fraction of the debt that crowds out private investment and thus can be used to measure how far from satisfying Ricardian equivalence is the economy. When R = 0 the increase in private saving is equal to the increase in public debt and no crowding out occurs. If R = 0.2 in a particular environment then twenty percent of the debt crowds out private investment and we could assert there is a twenty percent deviation from Ricardian equivalence in that environment. The closer R is to zero the better Ricardian equivalence is as an approximation for that environment. The closer R is to one, the less Ricardian is the economy -individuals consume most of the proceeds of the tax cut rather than increasing saving to pay for future tax increases and private investment falls by an amount approaching the amount of the debt. Worth noting is that a decline in private investment also will negatively affect output, thereby further depressing aggregate saving.
Most often we have 0 < R < 1, indicating consumers save only a portion of the tax cut and some crowding out occurs. It is possible to have R > 1, which could occur when the decrease in private investment combined with the tax increase necessary to pay interest on the debt lead to a decline in output (and bequests) that depresses private saving below its initial level. It is unclear what specific interpretation particular values of R have in these cases. At a minimum the fact that R > 1 indicates Ricardian equivalence fails dramatically; clearly, the government borrowing leads to a reduction in output, savings, etc., in these cases.
I assess the crowding out of private investment by debt when the debt is left outstanding indefinitely -a reasonable assumption given that governments today show little desire to repay the bulk of their outstanding debts. I model this by leaving debt outstanding for a length of time sufficient for the economy to reach a new steady state. 21 Leaving debt outstanding requires a small tax increase to pay the interest that accumulates each period. This experiment simulates the conditions countries with significant current public debts often experience.
DISTORTIONARY TAXES
For each specification I evaluate different combinations of lump sum, inheritance, and capital gains taxes.
Let B θ denote the tax rate on end-of-life bequests. Let G θ denote the tax rate on capital gains. The new budget constraints for a consumer born in period are as follows. 
For a middle-aged consumer: 
The government's period t budget constraint is now ( )
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To ensure generality of the results I performed a large number of runs; by varying the parameters of the model around the values given in Table 1 , I constructed a grid of over 10,000 parameter combinations.
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For each combination I determine the savings amounts for the initial, pre-debt, steady state and for the final, with-debt, steady state. I then calculate a value for R for each tax-policy combination for each model specification. The first column of Table 3 indicates the type of tax policy used to raise government revenues. The subsequent columns of Table 3 report average R values and standard deviations for each policy for the three different model specifications.
[insert Table 3 To understand why less crowding occurs in the manipulative specifications than occurs in the non-manipulative specification it may help to examine separately the effects of a temporary tax rate decrease and of a sustained increase in government borrowing. 25 For expositional clarity, the discussion below focuses on inheritance taxation; the results, however, are similar for capital gains taxation.
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In all three specifications, a one-period decline in the tax rate effectively provides individuals alive in that period with additional income. Because individuals care about the well-being of their child, they save and bequeath some of this additional income. 27 The next generation, while not benefiting directly from the tax cut, does receive additional income in the form of a larger bequest. These individuals also save and bequeath some of their additional income. Each successive generation also receives a larger bequest, and then gives a larger bequest, than they would have without the policy change. Since saving is an important part of setting aside resources for bequests, we expect aggregate saving to increase when bequests increase.
28
An increase in government borrowing reduces the supply of funds available for private investment, which causes the interest rate to increase. The greater return to saving (higher cost of borrowing) causes individuals to save more (borrow less) throughout their lifetime. Then, in the final period of life, with more wealth than they would have had without the interest rate increase, individuals divide their additional wealth between purchasing more goods and giving a larger bequest. It is clear that aggregate saving will increase in this case and, since (at least) part of savings are used for bequests, that bequests should increase as well. The net result, in both the manipulative and non-manipulative model specifications, of a temporary tax cut and a long-lasting debt increase, is a persistent increase in aggregate saving and in bequests.
How does the presence of intergenerational strategic behavior influence these changes? It was noted earlier that manipulation by children forces parents to transfer, via bequests, more of their wealth than is required of parents with non-manipulative children. Thus, when parents receive additional income, whether explicitly, as from a tax cut or a larger bequest, or implicitly, as from an interest rate increase, we expect manipulated parents to save and bequeath a larger portion of additional income relative to the portion saved and bequeathed by unmanipulated parents. The greater increase in aggregate saving in the manipulative specifications means less crowding out occurs in these specifications than occurs in the non-manipulative specification. The results in Table 3 suggest crowding out in the manipulative specifications may be twenty to twenty-seven percent smaller than it is in the nonmanipulative specification.
Finally, even though qualitative similarities exist between the effects occurring under inheritance and capital gains taxes, the results in Table 3 indicate that the deviation from Ricardian equivalence is consistently larger under an inheritance tax than it is under a capital gains tax. In other words, private saving increases more when there is a decrease in the capital gains tax rate than it does when there is a decrease in the inheritance tax rate. We know that decreasing either tax rate should cause saving to increase. However, a decrease in the capital gains tax rate directly increases the return to saving, while a decrease in the inheritance tax rate merely increases the return to one reason for saving: giving bequests.
Since bequests are not the only motive for saving, it is not surprising that the increase in aggregate saving is more substantial when the capital gains tax rate declines than it is when the inheritance tax rate declines. This difference could be particularly noteworthy given the current policy debate in the United
States regarding the future of the estate tax. The values in Table 3 suggest that using government debt to finance reductions in inheritance taxes will be more damaging to the economy -via greater crowding out and the accompanying reduction in output -than would using debt to finance reductions in capital gains taxes.
CONCLUSION
This paper has two primary goals. First, I extend the analysis of Ricardian equivalence and the intergenerational "Samaritan's dilemma" to a dynamic, general equilibrium environment by constructing a model with overlapping generations of three-period lived consumers. Analyzing computer simulations of this model shows the temporary substitution of government debt for current lump sum taxes has no effect on consumption, aggregate saving, or output in this framework. This result is independent of the sequence of choices undertaken within a period and of the specific parameter values selected.
The more substantial goal of this paper is to compare the crowding out effect of government debt in model specifications with and without intergenerational strategic behavior when taxes are distortionary.
The amount of crowding out is much greater in the specification without strategic behavior than it is in the specifications with strategic behavior. The exact form of strategic behavior (simultaneous vs.
sequential choices) has little impact on the results. In the specifications with strategic behavior the increased significance of bequests -the child's overconsumption when young forces greater reliance on bequests for income later in life -means parents give a larger bequest than they do in the specification without strategic behavior. Giving a larger bequest requires a parent to save more in the strategic specifications. In particular, when offered additional current income (e.g., via a tax cut), a manipulated parent is forced to bequeath and save a larger portion of the new income compared to the portion bequeathed and saved by an unmanipulated parent. This larger increase in saving when strategic behavior is present leads to a smaller amount of crowding out in these specifications.
The neutrality of lump sum taxes and smaller amount of crowding out with distortionary taxes might suggest further studies of the effects of deficit financing need not include strategic behavior.
However, allowing strategic behavior does change the resulting allocations. We also note that nonstrategic specifications can suffer time consistency problems and will overestimate the amount of crowding out occurring in manipulative families. The bottom line here is that the exact nature of intergenerational relationships affects the outcome of fiscal policy in a significant way. Thus it seems important to intensify our efforts to determine the true nature of these relationships. incorporate the Samaritan's dilemma into a two-period, parent-child model to examine a potential role for public parent-to-child transfers as a means of eliminating the child's incentive to act manipulatively.
ENDNOTES
7 Lucas (1986) suggests distortionary taxes may be the primary source of deviations from Ricardian equivalence.
One reason to examine crowding out is to design policies that encourage private saving. For example, Batina (1999) illustrates the importance of incorporating potential saving-for-bequest motives to understanding the effects of shifting to a consumption tax.
8 An illuminating empirical analysis by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) finds a slight negative relationship between estate tax rates and the size of reported estates. The theoretical work in this area continues to be divided. For example, Laitner (2001) , in a detailed general-equilibrium analysis, finds that removing estate taxes will increase aggregate saving. In contrast, using a partial-equilibrium analysis, Gale and Perozek (2001) conclude imposing estate taxes can actually increase aggregate saving, a result that is explored further below (see fn. 28). Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and Gale and Slemrod (2000) offer additional discussion of the relevant issues here.
9 Table 4 in Cremer and Pestieau (2003) summarizes the changes expected in response to a variety of fiscal policies for altruism and other bequest motives.
10 In a more general version of this model I allow inter vivos transfers in addition to end-of-life bequests. Because strategic behavior leads consumers to overconsume when young, parents always do best by not giving an inter vivos transfer. Thus prohibiting inter vivos transfers has no effect on the results of this analysis. While this may conflict with observations of middle-aged parents providing support to young children such transfers are generally tied to particular uses (such as education) rather than available for general consumption. Also, because one period in this model spans 20 years, inter vivos transfers made late in life are effectively combined with end-of-life bequests.
11 The intergenerational discount rate indicates the weight put on the child's utility in the parent's utility function.
For example, a value of 0.5 indicates the parent values his child's utility only 50 percent as much as the parent values his own utility from consumption. Then, in equilibrium, the parent seeks to equate his child's marginal utility of consumption to twice his own marginal utility of consumption. 14 A third possibility exists in that the child could make her choices before the parent makes his choices. I omit this case because it seems highly unlikely a parent considering a bequest would wait to make his saving decisions until the child made all of her pre-bequest decisions.
15 By assumption we are interested only the case of positive bequests. Then, since individuals can borrow or save and , all budget constraints and first order conditions are satisfied with equality.
16 A technical appendix (available from the author upon request) gives a specific derivation of this function for the computer simulations. 17 In the simultaneous-choice specification the young consumer chooses saving at the same time as the middleaged consumer chooses saving . Later, in the sequential-choice specification, the middle-aged consumer makes his saving decision before the young consumer acts so these functions are not dependent on in that specification.
18 See the optional technical appendix for details on the derivation of this result. 19 An analogous result is presented by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) . They show that a wealth redistribution amongst voluntary contributors to a public good has no effect of the provision of the public good. In my model the child's utility is a pure public good -both parent and child enjoy the child's utility non-rivalrously and without possibility of exclusion. The change in the timing of lump sum taxes is a simple redistribution across generations.
20 Altig and Davis (1989) uses a similar measure.
21 I also calculate R values for the case of immediate debt repayment and for the case when debt is left outstanding indefinitely. Not surprisingly, the values are significantly smaller when debt repayment is immediate. 22 The "max" operators on the right hand side of the following expressions reflect the fact that consumers may borrow as well as save, but capital gains taxes are collected only on returns to saving. 
